In tomorrow’s world, men [sic] will not need artificial instruments such as jets and space ships. In the world of tomorrow, the new man will ‘think’ the place he wants to go, then his mind will take him there.
–Sun Ra, 1956
Throughout her reading of the Socratic dialogues, Hannah Arendt frequently returns to the notions of thinking and doing. In many ways, her reading can be considered a re-reading, one that is directed at the core of Socratic philosophy, and that leaves aside the intermediary rhetoric of his student, Plato. In the context of her own meditations on collective responsibility and the existence of a moral imperative, Arendt uses Socrates’s ideas as a philosophical threshing tool, separating the “wheat” of ethics and thought from the “chaff” of doing. This critical division marks Arendt’s interpretation of the Socratic inner dialogue. According to Socrates, within the inner dialogue, what he himself calls dianoeisthai (a reflection on the nature of something), thinking occurs through conversation between self and I. This dialogue eventually generates decisions and judgments. The dianoeisthai is internalized and cut off from action, rendering the two incommensurable. Arendt employs the incommensurability as a means to disclose the banality of evil – of action without thought. As Arendt laments, “the sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their mind to be either good or bad.” Instead, they simply act.
This chapter is part of a larger project that explores the notion and typology of place-produced thought, or in other words, a topographic convergence of situated contemplation that produces a localized episteme. This is meant to articulate a particular type of thinking that activates place as a method for situating and focusing thinking. Within place-produced thought, the distinction between thinking and acting, as presented in the Arendtian-Socratic model needs to be reconsidered. Indeed, thinking is action, a process that is active, conscious, embodied, and subversive. The root of this conjoined action-thinking is within the intentionality of the subject. In each of the instances of place-produced thought, the thinker demonstrates a purposiveness and discursivity in the activation of place as a site for focusing thought. The intentionality of a conjoined action-thinking also allows us to distinguish it from a passive and tacit relationship with place.
A kind of tacit relationship with place continuously permeates thought. Indeed, place is always part of our being and thought process – “where’s your head at?” is a common idiom indicating the close link of thought with location. A more profound bond of place with being is made clear by Heidegger when he hyphenates da-sein: being occurs “there.” Being has a presence in place, before the truth of being is covered over and concealed by time. However, neither place as the location for being that Heidegger alleges, nor the exertion of place that we feel everyday, fully coincide with the function of place in the operation of place-produced thought. Instead, this activity is impelling; a conscious enterprise of activating a particular site in an effort to develop indigenous knowledge. Place is not something that happens to us, but that which is in part made by a subject. In each instance of place-produced thought there is a concerted effort to make something occur – a teleological derivation of a new body of thought – an actuation of knowledge. Place acts as a locator of/for and participant, in the emergence of a new episteme. To be clear, the subject asserts his or her individual agency by locating place and bringing into focus the margins of its boundaries. A particular variation of place is developed in place-produced thought; one that is located by the subject but also made by a network of forces and interactions. In the production of thought within place, subject and place become inter-subjective and emerge as co-creators.
In the Right Place at the Right Time: Locating Place
The criticality of intention and agency exercised by the thinker is also demonstrated in locating place. The Walden experiment conducted by Henry David Thoreau in the woods outside on Concord can be considered an illustration of place-produced thought. To locate a suitable place for his sojourn, Thoreau selected a locus for thought through the implementation of a double a priori. The first of these pre-existing conditions was the socio-historical layers within place (significations, structures of power, perceptions, topography, and land usage). As these forces encompassed the identity of place, they provided potential cognitive possibilities for Thoreau. In each specific case, the identity of place is perceived by the thinker as more or less attractive based upon the particulars of their project. While the forces constituting identity are often located in the place before actual engagement by the thinker, and in some cases appear as natural or embedded, they are often reconfigured by the second a priori – subjective agency. In most of the instances of place-produced thought, the subject has some conception of the thought that will be developed in situ. Therefore, through the exertion of agency, the thinker actually contributes to the making or production of the place as an optimal environment for his or her project. The authority of subjective a priori energies, such as desires, motivations, inadequacies, and fallibilities, can be so strong that place is often molded or created to satisfy their fulfillment.
One may argue against the power afforded to the subject within place-produced thought by pointing to the potential downward spiral of egoistic navel gazing or the possible violent imposition of hegemonic power. This concern has been elucidated by Miwon Kwon in her assessment of several historical site-specific and community based art practices.  An alternative to this regression entails an understanding of active subject formation and its own constitution as an agent in the world that is a departure from the traditional segregation of self and other – of self and world. This separation is a constrictive presumption evident in empiricism (Locke and Hume), rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant) and even the linguistic turn.  In order to articulate and explore a means of resistance to the aforementioned spiral, a return to the philosophy of Hannah Arendt serves as a crucial starting point.
In another aspect of her Socratic re-examination, Arendt circuitously navigates the critical connection between the singular subject and the plural (or the political as Arendt names it). As a proponent of solitude, in which the purity of the inner dialogue is realized, Arendt vis-à-vis Socrates requires isolation for thought to properly occur. Any contact duringdianoeisthai is considered unsettling and detrimental; “if somebody addresses me, I must now talk to him, and not to myself.”  The Socratic estrangement, however, is given a clever hermeneutic twist by Arendt when she ponders that “the Socratic ‘being-one’ is not so unproblematic as it seems; I am not only just for others but for myself, and in the latter case, I clearly am not just one. A difference is inserted into my Oneness.”  What Arendt points toward in this excerpt is the interdependence of the singular and collective. She also deftly, yet subtlety pokes at the unity of the hermetic singular subject – the metaphysical “Oneness” with a capital “O” – into which Arendt inserts a difference.
In this regard, Arendt is one among the many philosophers who have wrestled with the metaphysical binary of singular and collective. Indeed, phenomenology emerged in the early 20th century with a new concern for the ontological link between the subject and the world. Heidegger’s phenomenology was significant because it rearticulated the ontological status of the singular, shifting it into one that melded being with the world it was thrown into. By extending Heidegger’s ontology of being-in-the-world, Jean-Luc Nancy also attempts to navigate the terrain between singular and plural. Nancy pushes toward an even more radical ontological bond when he posits that being itself, depends upon a “being-in-common,” upon an understanding that inextricably locates the collective within the singular. Nancy deems this ontological status asbeing singular plural, in which the individual is given through the plural, and where “consciousness is never mine, but to the contrary, I only have it in and through community [Nancy’s italics].”  An equivalent melding of the individual and community operates in the active subjectivity of place-produced thought. This critical connection disavows a pejorative “unsiting,” in which place is pressed into or appropriated for, the forced servitude of an individual agenda. In place-produced thought, the community, the plural, remains an active influence on place identity. The Arendtian “difference” that is inserted into the subject is uncovered as the presence of the polyphonic multiple of community. Therefore, community can be understood as being active in two different stages of place-produced thought. Firstly, as Arendt and others have illustrated, the collective is preserved within the singular subject. Secondly, community is also evident in the constitution of place as part of the intertextual dialogue of events and actions.
A Place of My Own: The Delineation of Place
In many ways, the networked process of locating place is paralleled by the actual delineation of place. As has already been noted, even though the individual thinker arrives at the delineation or determination of the margins of place, the process can’t be considered univocal or unilateral, but instead is infused with the polyphony of community. The term “margin” is used here purposely for its implications of fluidity, malleability and lack of exacting focus. The parameters of the places in place-produced thought often reflect these semantics, remaining elusive and enigmatic. Even the setting up of the boundaries of place does not entail an absolute dissociation from its exterior. In most instances of place-produced thought, that which is outside the margins of a place serves just as a critical role as that which is within place.
Jacques Derrida provides some insights into why this must be the case in his theory of the ergon and parerga in works of art. Calling upon the traditions of aesthetic discourse, he conveys that to even “think art in general” is to adopt a series of oppositions –form/content, inside/outside, subject/object.  By identifying these oppositional presuppositions, Derrida is able to build a discourse about their liminality; through that method, he begins to explore a space of in-betweeness where nothing is fixed or certain, where différance resides.  The deconstruction of the frame between the artwork (ergon) and the ostensibly extrinsic (parerga) is one of Derrida’s critical gestures. In fact, he argues that the two spaces are entwined. “A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon… but it does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside.”  Giorgio Agamben conceives of a similar contingency amongst stasis and dynamis in a work of art. “Every image is animated by an antinimous polarity,” declares Agamben, “[the dynamis] always refers beyond itself, towards a whole of which it is a part.” 
Within place-produced thought, we see the same connectivity between the inside and outside of place; between place and the wider community. In most instances, discerning the locus of thought reveals the presence of two (or more) places and an oscillation between them. All of these places, together, as a whole comprise the actual site of indigenous knowledge production. For example, in the Walden experiment, Thoreau details the constitution of the ergon, the city of Concord, as restrictive and authoritative, cut off from the essence of life. This particular characterization was strategic for Thoreau because it allowed him to discover and develop another place, geographically sequestered from the former. As we know, within the Derridean scheme, the alternative site can be considered a parergon. In addition, and more importantly for Thoreau than a mere terrestrial migration, the parergon offered a potential breach/break from the ideological, political, and signifying impositions of the original heterotopic site. For Thoreau, Walden Pond provided a means of subverting the ideological regulations within/of the town of Concord.
However, as Derrida demonstrated within works of art, the juxtaposition between the ergon, and the demarcation of its exterior, are locked in a mutual relationship of epistemic production by a “link which rivets [the parerga]… to the lack in the interior of the ergon.”  As a whole morphology, the diametrically opposed places and the liminality between them, are temporarily delineated for the purpose of the thinking project. The place is continuously produced, deterritorialized, and produced again in a process that “stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface.”  Heidegger also employed a strategy of diametric opposition amongst places. This strategy is evidenced by the construction of a small cabin in the Black Forest, where he would produce most of his writing. As a place, the cabin was devised as a location forphilosophical ruminations on being and existence, and as a contrast to his urban home in Freiberg. The relation and movement between these places emerge as the Heidegger’s locus of thought -- the place that produced his thinking.
In many ways the approach taken by Thoreau, Heidegger, and others attempting to find a place to situate thought, is similar to the rhetorical strategy of negation. Within this tradition, negation is utilized as a subversive and creative act that sheds the deprecatory association of the negative. Instead, negation is used to “celebrate a genuine point of beginning – with its attendant hope and promise for the future.”  Negation can be especially effective when political and cultural impositions have been fixed in place as either normative or tradition. Strategic negation in the delineation of place both affirms as it denies, erases as it generates, and can function as “a kind of provisional erasure.”  This action of erasure can be apophatic – the accumulation of knowledge through negation.
In terms of strategies, essentialism is another approach that can be deployed when delineating place. As a strategy it can be an effective means of subversion, disruption and creation. Many forms of essentialism, such ethnic essentialism or biological reductionism, can lead to dangerous generalizations and sweeping underestimations. However, what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes about the strategic use of positivist essentialism can be considered analogous to the delineation of place within place-produced thought. When the term “strategic essentialism” first appeared in her essay Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography in 1988, Spivak was insistently clear about the distinction she was making between a strategy and a regulative theory. For Spivak, strategy is temporal, productive and spurious – a sudden down pour of rain on a desolate sahara, setting into motion a series of eruptions in growth and bloom – creating action in the world. Read as a strategy within the context of this typology of place-produced thought, strategic essentialism is revealed as a conceptual strategy of demarcation, one that retains the irreducible margins of place. Place is temporarily delineated as a strategy to focus thought. Place resists being essentialized by the thinker, as it’s/its inherent lack is supplemented by the out of place parerga. At the same time some delineation occurs, and the demarcation of place by Thoreau, Heidegger and others, can be understood as a strategic exegesis, an instrument to position a localizing center of knowledge production – a centrum cogitationis. Within the strategic delineation, place becomes activated as “we intend within it; we critique intentions within it; we play with it through significations as well as references.” 
Unsiting Place: Subjectivity in Action
Through the intentional actions of locating, making, and strategically delineating place, a locus of thought quickly begins to unfold for the thinker. Once place has been constituted and confirmed by the thinker, a corollary product of these actions, the unsiting of place, occurs through the transformative power of subjective agency. The pre-existing forces of constituting place are reconfigured through the working, functioning, and performance of developing thought. The place is made “anew,” as it is drawn into the circle of cognition that deposits unretractable marks onto its being.
This embodiment of action in the production of place-produced thought calls for a reconsideration of the anti-humanism and domination of language so prominent since the linguistic turn. This reassessment is not to suggest an abandonment of signification in the discourse of subject formation; rather, it promotes an elliptical approach that resists a singular, univocal and dominant model. Instead, in the reconsideration of postmodern anti-humanism and the primacy of language, each philosophical theory can retain some of its efficacy and validity. Therefore, rather than focusing on the divergence between theories, we are faced with analyzing the relation, impasse, expression, and violence between the constituting forces of place, as they trace onto one another. The agency of the subject within place-produced thought acts as an organizing operation that negotiates those traces. The relational and temporal organization includes the disruption and continuous redistribution of these forces by the coalescing actions/thoughts of the thinker.
What we are edging towards with this assertion is no less than an incursion into the history of the discourse on the formation of the subject.  As a significant figure in this trajectory, Descartes imagined the subject as autogenic merely through thought – res cognitas. Against indictments of absolute solipsism towards the subject of the early Enlightenment, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau brought forth a subject that was pure, unified and singular. Indeed, the intelligibility of their theories is grounded upon the lynchpin of the productive autonomous subject. If we could imagine the formation of the Enlightenment subject being translated into an equation, it might appear as such: purity + unity + autonomy = subject. After Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the prominence of the individual mind in the formation of the subject was extended by the transcendental idealism of Kant. The Copernican revolution proposed by Kant positioned the mind as central to all experience and epistemology. Kant suggested that all phenomena were interpreted by the a priori Concepts of the Understanding. Therefore, the pre-existing structure of the subject’s mind formed the foundation of experience and thought. The import of the individual mind stood, basically intact, until the 20th century. During the later part of the century, the postmodernist critique of the subject emerged to effectively dismantled each of the variables in the subject formation equation so that it read: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of outside power = subject (no subjectivity). For Foucault and other postmodernists, the critical distinction of the Enlightenment subject was that it was brought to the discourse. As Foucault suggests, the concept of the autonomous subject was an invention of the Enlightenment, a product of a specific episteme. For Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau it was a historical moment when the subject could finally slide out from under the thumb of the monarchy and church, and emerge from the shadows of the cave into the world of light, knowledge and self-formation.
Much like Foucault, Louis Althusser also claimed that the modern subject was a construct. As a Marxist, Althusser, believed that the state produced subjects that would best sustain and edify it’s/its own power and ideology. Through the determination by Ideological State Apparatuses (mass media, cultural institutions, educational institutions and so on), and not by individual agency or autonomy, the subject is molded into a product of, and puppet for, the dominant class. In the 20th century, the shift toward the anti-humanism of poststructuralism emerged from structuralism’s tendency to negate the primacy of the subject in favor of structures, signs and discourse. For Claude Levi-Strauss and other structuralists, the subject was given through the underlying structures of society – the driving force of universal patterns in human thought subsumed individual agency.
Not all contemporary philosophies have been convinced of the passivity of the subject in the process of its own formation. For instance, Judith Butler makes a critical inquiry in her discussion of subjectification: “how can it be that the subject, taken to be the condition for and instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination, understood as the deprivation of agency?”
In the operation of place-produced thought, subjectivity takes on new meaning as an instrument of organization for constituting forces. This is not a device of unitary power, but one that is encumbered by the plural, both an active and receptive epistemic organizer of meaning. At the same time however, this revaluation of the subject is not a return to the humanist subject of the Enlightenment, nor does it, “nurture the illusion that… man and woman may live as a demiurge, single-handedly and completely taking charge of their destiny.”In this typology of place-produced thought, the postmodernist version of the subject formation equation has been modified as such: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of outside power = subject. We have retained the variables leading to the negation of the subject, but have recalibrated their sum. In place-produced thought, an active subject is positioned as operating within the fractured, multiple and collective terrain(s) of his or her own formation.
Many of the poststructuralists were quick to point out the fractures and slippages in the logos of Western metaphysics, including the concept of a free willing, self-contained subject. While this typology does criticize the near complete annulment of subjective agency in poststructuralist thought, it simultaneously recognizes that it was those very thinkers who deconstructed the grand authority of the cohesive singular subject. In “The Death of the Author,” for example, Roland Barthes alludes to the disruptive faculty of subjective agency as he dismantles the despotic position of the author in the creation of meaning. Taking Barthes’s cue, if we think of the author as the existing, predetermined constituting forces of place; the agency of the thinker becomes a signal of its death. By death we do not mean disappearance or obliteration (and neither does Barthes); rather, death is intended as the dissolution of hegemony and the cessation of the univocal determination of meaning and epistemology. The subjective agency in place-produced thought achieves this very proposition, as it resists the absolutism and ferocious autonomy of the singular Enlightenment subject. The pitfall that Derrida read within Heidegger and other variegations of humanism was the terrifying megalomaniacal centrality of the ideological self-creating subject.
Jacques Rancière offers a similar reallocation of the subject in his description of emancipation: “It means that every situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification.”  A reconfiguration of forces occurs in the unsiting of place by the subjective agent. In each instance, the thinker unsites and remakes the place (within his or her inextricable connectivity to the collective and place) to arrive at a certain epistemic formation, and in doing so creates the source of/for a new body of thought. This localized knowledge is given concomitantly by the existing place and the thinking action of the subject. Barthes also promoted the active subject as a locator, “that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which… [place] is constructed.” 
The very power of the subject in organizing the constituting forces of place lies not only in the germination of knowledge, but also in the ontological transformation of place as it becomes melded to the thought produced by and within it. By returning to the analogical analysis of Butler, an understanding of determinative reciprocation between epistemology and ontology can be articulated. When discussing the formation of the conscious subject, Butler continually reveals the significant consequence of sex, sexuality and gender as epistemic points of departure. As epistemic sources, these concepts both limit and bear the possibilities of being. Butler and others such as Haraway and Foucault have given great attention the entanglement of knowledge regulation and the potentiality of being. For Foucault, much of his archeological unearthing of discourse formation has concentrated on the imposition and dispersion of power and codes that nullify and construct orders of discursivity, normativity, and sociality. In the Foucauldian model, the exertion of power is transferred through the linguistics of taxonomy. An “a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, [and] defines the mode of being [author’s italics].”  As a poststructuralist, Foucault gives precedence to language and power in defining the field of the subject. There is minimal potency given to the subject – as they merely provide the space for power relations and discourse to realize their determinative goals of self-preservation. Butler, on the other hand, offers a rendition of the Foucauldian critique that does not render the subject powerless. Instead, Butler describes how, in a fashion similar to what has been noted in the development of place-produced thought, the agency of the subject retains a recalcitrant capacity. The emergent knowledge developed in place-produced thought contains the disruption of agency. As the subject produces knowledge in concert with other constituting forces, it is affixed to the ontology of place so that, as Foucault claims, it “defines its mode of being.” However, just as Butler criticizes Foucault’s presumption of the body as a statictabula rasa awaiting cultural inscription, this typology is also an attempt to negotiate and navigate an epistemological space that includes, but relinquishes the predominance of signification, in the formation of knowledge. Rather, it is maintained that the subversion of acting and thinking (what Butler calls performance), “suggests an openness to resignification and recontextualization.”  Crucially, this approach is articulated in a manner that allows for a mutable and pliable derivation of place infused knowledge. At the same time, the place-produced thought holds ontological weight, as the emergent localized episteme becomes a part of the being of place. There is an inherent localizing urgency within this approach because the unretractable marks of thought etch themselves onto place, forcing the tenable distinction between place and the thought it produces to disappear under the erasure of concomitance. Thinking, doing, and place simply coalesce as one –being singular plural.
Agamben, Giorgio, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, (Verso, 1993).
Arendt, Hannah, Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken, 2005).
Barthes, Roland, Image-Music-Text (Hill and Wang, 1978).
Butler, Judith, Society and Culture Bundle RC: Bodies That Matter, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2011).
———. RC Series Bundle: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2006).
———. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press,
Derrida, Jacques, The Truth in Painting, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1987).
———. Of Grammatology (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, First Edition.
Heartfield, James, “Postmodernism and the ‘Death of the Subject,’” Marxist Internet
Archive, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/heartfield-james.htm
Kwon, Miwon, One Place after Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity. (The MIT Press,
Martin, Terence, “The Negative Structures of American Literature,” American Literature, Vol.
57, No. 1 (Mar., 1985)
Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Inoperative Community. (University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
Rancière, Jacques, The Emancipated Spectator (Verso, 2011).
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Outside in the Teaching Machine, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2008).
Spurr, David, The rhetoric of empire: colonial discourse in journalism, travel writing, and imperial administration (Duke University Press, 1993).
Thoreau, Henry David, Walden (Beacon Press, 2004).
Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken, 2005). 180.
Miwon Kwon, One Place after Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity (The MIT Press, 2004).
Other new developments in philosophy have attempted to move beyond the separation of self and world, or what Kant deemed the division of the noumenal and phenomenal. The term “The Speculative Turn,” in reference to the “Linguistic Turn,” has been given to a resurgence and rearticulation of a new materialism and realism. The publication of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude is often noted as the spark of this movement.
Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment. (Schocken, 2005). 98.
Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, 1st ed. (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1991). 19.
Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1987). 22.
The term “différance” is being employed here in the sense provided by Derrida in Of Grammatology, where the term is a conjunction of the words “differed” and “different,” but also implies a structure that is never completely translatable as it slips away into ambiguous alterities and deferments.
Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1987). 54.
Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, annotated edition. (Verso, 2007). 154.
Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1987). 59.
Judith Butler, Society and Culture Bundle RC: Bodies That Matter, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2011). xviii.
Terence Martin, “The Negative Structures of American Literature,” American Literature, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), 5.
David Spurr, The rhetoric of empire: colonial discourse in journalism, travel writing, and imperial administration (Duke University Press, 1993). 92.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2008). 6.
While plenty has been written on the history of the formation of the subject, there are several key texts within this tradition including: Rousseau’s Of The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Heidegger’sBeing and Time, Levi-Strauss’ The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Foucault’s The Order of Things, and Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”
Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 1997). 10.
James Heartfield, “Postmodernism and the ‘Death of the Subject,’” Marxist Internet Archive, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/heartfield-james.htm
Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (Verso, 2011). 49.
Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text (Hill and Wang, 1978). 146.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, First Edition. (Vintage, 1994). 158.
Judith Butler, RC Series Bundle: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2006). 188.